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Several studies show that teachers make use of grading practices to affect students’
effort and achievement. Generally linearity is assumed in the grading equation,
while it is everyone’s experience that grading practices are frequently non-linear.
Representing grading practices as linear can be misleading both from a descriptive
and a prescriptive viewpoint. Here we propose to identify grading practices as
‘deviations from a reference’, which is a fully non-parametric criterion, and
measure their effects on achievement based on this classification. To show the
effectiveness of our approach, we apply the methodology to a data-set on Italian
lower secondary school.
Keywords: evaluation; grading practice; students’ achievement; classification
techniques
1. Introduction
Strong evidence has been provided in the economic literature about the positive rela-
tionship between education and earnings (Card 1999). A large debate is open, instead,
on the role of quantity and quality of schooling in determining the education results,
in terms of students’ achievement, job opportunities, and earnings: is it worth invest-
ing more resources in schooling, with the aim to improve the quality of the education
process? To what extent are these resources a substitute for an additional year of
school? Hanushek (2002, 2003), for example, criticizes schooling policies simply
based on input increasing, concluding that the increase in the cost of education does
not yield remarkable improvement in students’ achievement and, consequently, in
their earnings perspectives. Krueger (2002, 2003), on the other hand, analyzes the
same empirical evidence, drawing the opposite conclusion. Interestingly, Hanushek
(2003) indicates, as a fallacy of the studies on the impact of schooling policies, the
lack of attention to the incentives mechanisms within schools: when little feedback to
good performance is provided, it should not be surprising that added resources do not
yield significant improvement to achievement. One of the devices that can affect the
achievement of the students, given the cost of the education policy, is the grading
procedures chosen by the teachers. In slightly different terms, the criterion used by the
teacher to assign grades conditional to the observed achievement may be considered
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a (fairly) costless input of the education process, and greater attention should be
devoted to choosing proper grading practices.
Moreover, an erroneous distribution of incentives (both to teachers and students)
in designing grading standards is at the basis of the widespread and worrisome
phenomenon of grade inflation (see, for example, Johnes 2004). As far as school
grades are considered, a reliable indicator of students’ ability by the labor market and,
at the same time, an indicator of teachers’ quality by the school managing authorities,
a well-known free-rider problem, can be observed (Marks 2002): students put pressure
on teachers to get good marks with low effort, and teachers have an incentive to assign
good marks to low achievement in order to improve their quality signal. The result is
a progressive fall of grading standards, known as grade inflation. As a consequence,
grades can no longer be assumed as indicators of performance of the education
institutions, and they miss a great part of their potential role in sorting more able and
less able students and in signaling their actual achievement.
The issue is discussed by an increasing stream of papers, which suggests that the
strategic use of grading practices by teachers may affect students’ effort and achieve-
ment at any level of the education process. Through grade assignment, in fact, teach-
ers can do much more than simply register the knowledge level achieved by their
students: they can give a reward to student improvement, encourage further effort,
stimulate students’ potential ability, and punish indolence. In particular, according to
several empirical studies, if a teacher makes use of high grade standards (i.e. gives
good marks for high performance only), his/her students may achieve, ceteris paribus,
higher knowledge.
In empirical studies, researchers measure the stringency of grading standards
assuming a linear grading equation; that is, a linear relationship between achieve-
ment (usually measured by a test score) and grades, and estimating the two parame-
ters (intercept and slope) of this function. The estimated coefficients should
characterize the stringency of the grading practice. But frequently, one of the two
estimated parameters results in non-statistical significance: hence, one is ignored and
the other is used to univocally identify and order the grading practices. The
coefficients of the linear grading equation are included as regressors into an
education production function (EPF) and are used to estimate the impact of grading
standards on achievement.
It is common-sense that in order to be able to evaluate the effect of grading prac-
tices on students achievements it is, at first, necessary to identify these practices.
Surely, linearity and ordering are convenient shortcuts at an explanatory level, but
unfortunately, the actual relationship between achievement and grades may be non-
linear: sometimes teachers show a preference for using extreme grades or, conversely,
median grades only; sometimes they over-reward (under-reward) high performances
so that their grading profiles show increasing (decreasing) growth rates, and so on. In
these cases, imposing a linear relationship between achievement and grades may
neglect these aspects of the grading scheme and may lead to incorrect evaluation of
the grading standards.
This paper proposes a new approach based on the definition of a reference grading
practice and an indicator of deviation from this reference: the aim is to properly
capture, in a fully non-linear and non-parametric way, all kinds of grading strategies.
The indicator of the ‘Deviation from the Reference’ (DfR) can be further included into
the EPF and used to evaluate the effects of the different grading practices on
the achievement of the students. The indicator can be used to implement education
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Education Economics 3
policies aimed at controlling grade inflation and inducing compliance towards a
specific grading standard.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the instruments used by the
economic literature to measure the effects of grading practice on student achieve-
ments. Section 3 motivates the DfR approach. Section 4 introduces a data-set used to
discuss the fallacies of the assumption of linearity on grading practices both at class
and school levels. Section 5 explains how to construct the DfR indicator in details
using real data. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis of the data introduced in
Section 4. The results confirm that, in line with the literature, higher grading standards
favor students’ performance, but also show that grading practice cannot be ordered.
Compared with the linear approach, the DfR indicator is able to capture the variety of
grading practices properly and their effects on achievement. Some policy suggestions
are proposed in Section 7, and possible limitations of the DfR approach are discussed
in the last section.
2. Grading equations and student achievements: a review
Several empirical studies about the effect of grading practices on students’ achieve-
ment find their theoretical background in Correa and Gruver (1987) and Costrell
(1994). Both of these models provide justifications for higher grade standards affect-
ing students’ effort and achievement.
All of the empirical studies descending from these frameworks adopt a linear
grading equation, 
to characterize the grading standards: in particular, estimating the parameters of the
grading equation, Bonesronning (1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2008) finds that the slope is
seldom significant, while the intercept is.
The estimated intercept  of the linear grading equation is usually included as a
regressor into the EPF, and shows the positive effect of higher grading standards on
students’ achievement.
The effect of higher standards on average achievement and their potential distri-
butional consequences are examined by Betts (1997, 1998) and Betts and Grogger
(2003). These authors indicate that higher standards improve average students’
performance, affecting the achievement test scores of abler students more than those
of the less able. In these papers the stringency of grading standards is measured by a
linear regression of the achievement test scores on the school grades,1 allowing for
school fixed effects. The estimates of the fixed effects are included into an education
production function as indicators of the grading practices, and show their positive
effect.
A positive effect of higher grading standard on students’ achievement is also esti-
mated by Figlio and Lucas (2004), using a data-set on elementary school pupils. They
also agree with Betts and Grogger (2003) about the existence of considerable distri-
butional effects. Figlio and Lucas (2004) represent a partial exception to the adoption
of a linear grading equation. In their paper, in fact, three different measures of grading
standards are proposed – and a couple of them are non-parametric and, to some extent,
related to the present proposal.
grade achievement= +β β0 1 ,
βˆ0
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3. The DfR approach
This section introduces an indicator that can be used to describe grading practices,
whose application is postponed to Sections 5 and 6.
The idea of DfR is a basic and common concept to describe variability in the
social sciences. The best known example is the notion of variance, which
measures the average deviance from a reference value (the mean). Variability
does not necessarily induce an ordering on behaviors, and this is particularly true
for social phenomena (see, for example, the concept of ‘deviating behaviour’ in
criminology).
We deploy the DfR intuition to capture the variability of grading practices.
Assume the availability of an objective measure of competence (e.g. the score of a
multiple choice test) and of a subjective one (e.g. the teacher’s grades) for each
student. The DfR procedure is based on the following three steps: 
(i) Define an arbitrary, ex ante, relationship that maps scores to grades: for exam-
ple, it maps the intervals of normalized scores2 [0.0,0.6), [0.6,0.7), [0.7,0.8),
[0.8,0.9), [0.9,1.0] to grades F,D,C,B,A, respectively.
This constitutes the ‘reference’ grading practice, defined in order to evaluate
the deviations of all the observed grading standards from it.
(ii) Measure the deviation of teacher’s grade from the reference grade for any
given student score. Due to the fact that the DfR approach does not provide a
single quantity but rather a deviance profile, teachers with similar DfR profiles
are grouped into classes that constitutes the items of a categorical variable: the
DfR variable. The values of the DfR variable naturally identify the grading
practices.
(iii)The DfR variable can be included into an education production function
in order to estimate the effect of these grading practices on students’
competence: 
 
where S, X and Y are, respectively, vectors of student’s, teacher’s and school’s
characteristics.
How to apply in practice the steps of the DfR procedure will be illustrated in details
in Sections 5 and 6 on empirical data.
4. On the linearity assumption
It is common-sense that the relationship between achievement and grades is hardly
linear. At the same time, when non-linear grading practices are aggregated, say, by
school, district, and so forth, they seem to be linear – and this is taken as evidence of
a linear school policies when, on the contrary, what is observed is merely the effect of
averaging.
In this section we present some evidence about both issues, analyzing single
teacher grading practices and showing the fallacy of the linearity assumption on
empirical cases. As a driving example, we will present a data-set that will be used
throughout the rest of the paper.
achievement epf S X Y DfR= ( , , , )
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Education Economics 5
4.1 The data-set
The survey has been carried out on a sample of 20 lower secondary schools3 in
Lombardy (Italy) during the period 2003–2005. Three multiple-choice achievement
tests (Italian language, mathematics and science) were administered to first-year
students in March 2003. Similar tests (for Italian language and mathematics only)
were submitted to the same students subsequently (second-year students in May
2004, and third-year students in May 2005). In May 2005 a questionnaire was
administered both to students (about their school carrier and school climate) and to
teachers (about their professional features and school environment). A longitudinal
archive has been set up in 2005, containing the records of 1243 (for Italian
language) and 1259 (for mathematics) students, belonging to 77 classes, who took
part in all the three waves of the survey. We use the data-set on Italian language in
the following application. The same analysis on mathematics has been made and is
not reported here, but the results obtained on the Italian language data-set are
confirmed.
Every year, the final grade of the students is registered (ITA03, ITA04). The
third-year grade corresponds to the teacher’s evaluation at the end of the first semes-
ter (ITA05FST). All grades are coded by A, B, C, D, F. The normalized test scores
are represented by variables SCITA03, SCITA04, SCITA05, respectively, and have
been converted into Rasch measures M03ITA, M04ITA, M05ITA to make scores
comparable from year to year when used together in the same regression model. This
conversion does not affect the definition of DfR, which will be discussed in the next
section.
The control variables are: GENDER, the student’s gender; M03ITA, the initial
achievement level; NCLASS, the number of students in the class; NPROFITA, a
discrete variable indicating whether the student changed the teacher once ore more
during the lower secondary school; CHANGECL, a dummy indicating whether the
student changed class during the lower secondary school; and BOOKS, a proxy of the
family background (number of books at home).
4.2 Evidence of non-linearity
Figure 1 reports the results for 77 lower secondary school classes in the data-set: for
each class, the relationship between the scores of achievement test (SCITA05) and the
school grades (ITA05FST) on Italian language in 2005 is shown. For each class we
estimate the following linear grading equation: 
where Cj is the set of indexes of the observations in class j, and j = 1, …, 77, and also
a non-parametric regression.4 Both estimated models are represented in Figure 1. As
one can notice, in several cases the linear assumption seems to be inadequate to
describe the phenomenon: sometimes grades grow more than proportionally with
respect to achievement (e.g. Classes 54, 60, 67, 2, 11), sometimes they grow less than
proportionally (e.g. Classes 72, 68, 44), and in other classes the grading practice are
simply non-monotonic with respect to the achievement scores (e.g. Classes 58, 46, 4).
So, the linear assumption of Equation (1) is not satisfied.
ITA FST SCITA i Ci i i i j05 05 10 1= + ∈β β , , ( )
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Education Economics 7
Figure 1. The non-linear behavior of grading practices in the 77 classes.4.3 Do school-level grading standards really exist?
Here we focus on the second issue: sometimes, when working with aggregated data,
linear behaviors may appear. This is used as empirical evidence to justify the exist-
ence of a school grading policy. We think that the evidence of such a policy is in
general debatable, and sometimes the assumption seems to be motivated more by the
availability of the data rather than by true evidence of schools’ policies. Dardanoni,
Modica, and Pennisi (2009a, 2009b), for example, are forced to assume the existence
of a school policy because they are carrying out a comparative study on grading prac-
tices based on the OECD PISA 2003 data-set (OECD 2005), which is aggregated at
the school level. They motivate the adoption of a linear grading practice, arguing that,
if the teachers are constrained by students’ perception of unfairness in assigning
grades, the grading policy should be linear. But in our data, this assumption is violated
in several classes (see again Figure 1): as we noticed, it may even happen that teachers
assign lower grades to higher achievement, and vice versa.
If we aggregate the 77 classes of our data-set at the school level, the grading
behavior we observe is, to some extent, more linear than we observe at the single-class
level (see Figure 2). Is this the evidence of a school grading policy or are we simply
averaging out the different practices of the teachers belonging to each school?
Figure 2. Grading practices aggregated by school.Let us estimate the linear grading equations at the school level: 
where Sk is the set of indexes of the observations in class k, and k = 1, …, 20. Results
are presented in Table 1.
Consider School S07, whose grading equation seems to be not so far from linear-
ity: if the teachers belonging to School S07 were following a school grading policy,
we would observe some kind of compliance with this policy and hence their behaviors
should be quite similar to each other and to the general standard. On the contrary, what
we observe in Figure 3, where the single-class grading equations of School S07 are
shown, does not seem to confirm a compliance with a general policy – see, for
instance, Classes S07(37) and S07(39) versus Classes S07(34), S07(35) and S07(40).
Figure 3. Grading practices of School S07 by class.The consequences of the linearity assumption at the school level might be relevant
if we want to provide incentives to schools whose high grading standards – according
to the literature – seem to positively affect students’ achievement. So, for instance,
using a policy based on linear modeling, one would like to penalize School S07
because its slope  is one of the highest (see Table 1) and indicates a low grading
standard. But, as previously discussed, the single-teacher standards inside School S07
are quite diversified (see again Figure 3). So, if we decide to penalize School S07
because of its generous grading standard, we are, at the same time, punishing both
generous and severe standards, giving a biased incentive to the teachers.
5. Definition of the reference
We now apply the DfR approach. As said, a quick look at Figure 1 shows high heter-
ogeneity in teacher’s behavior. Each of these behaviors corresponds to a grading prac-
tice that we try to identify properly via the DfR approach. To this aim, we need to
introduce the reference in this experiment. Define as a reference a class5 where grades
are given according to the arbitrary scale of achievement scores described in Table 2.
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5.1 The DfR variable
Let us go back to our current application and let us reclassify each grading practice
according to the deviation of the teacher’s behavior from the reference as identified in
Table 2. For each class, the average test score corresponding to each grade is evalu-
ated; then, an integer value is associated to each grade according to the discrepancy
between the effective scores of the class and the theoretical scores of the reference
class (see Table 3).
For instance, consider the average test score  corresponding to Grade C. We
proceed as follows: if  ∈ [0,0.6), a value of +2 is assigned (strong over-evaluation);
if  ∈ [0.6,0.7), a value +1 is assigned (mild over-evaluation); if  ∈ [0.7,0.8), a
value of 0 is assigned (no deviation); if  ∈ [0.8,0.9), a value of −1 is assigned (mild
under-evaluation); if  ∈ [0.9,1], a value of −2 is assigned (strong under-evaluation).
Similarly for the other grades. When a grade is never used by a teacher, then that
particular grade is considered as missing in his grading practice.
In such a way, a predominance of negative values indicates higher grading
standard, whilst a predominance of positive values indicates lower standards. Each
class or, more precisely, each teacher’s grading practice is now identified by a profile
containing the five variables F, D, …, A. The profiles represent the deviation of the
teacher’s average grades from the reference. Each variable F, D, …, A can assume
integer values in the interval [−4; +4]. Next, teachers are grouped (e.g. by means of
cluster analysis), and each group constitutes an item of the new categorical variable
DfR describing the different grading practices applied by the teachers. This new
variable DfR is then included into an education production function, in order to
evaluate the effect of grading standards on the students’ achievement.
5.2 Identification of the grading practices in our data
We have chosen to identify the grading practices adopted in 2005 and estimate their
impact on achievement in the same year. This is because, while teachers are not
SC
SC
SC SC
SC
SC
Table 2. ‘Reference’ grading function of normalized test scores.
Score Grade Original Italian grade
[0.0,0.6) F ‘Insufficiente’
[0.6,0.7) D ‘Sufficiente’
[0.7,0.8) C ‘Buono’
[0.8,0.9) B ‘Distinto’
[0.9,1.0] A ‘Ottimo’
Table 3. Classification criterion of grading practices.
Score Grade F Grade D Grade C Grade B Grade A
[0.0,0.6) 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
[0.6,0.7) −1 0 +1 +2 +3
[0.7,0.8) −2 −1 0 +1 +2
[0.8,0.9) −3 −2 −1 0 +1
[0.9,1.0] −4 −3 −2 −1 0
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12  S.M. Iacus and G. Porro
supposed to change class during the school year, they might have changed throughout
the period 2003–2005: therefore, the restriction to year 2005 ensures a one-to-one
correspondence between teachers and classes.
Nevertheless, in the two previous years (2003 and 2004) teachers and/or students
might have changed class. Therefore, the achievement may be the result of different
teachers’ grading practices. The number of students who remain with the same teacher
amounts to more than 66% of the sample size. The proportion of students who
changed class is 2.5%. Further, to control for potential effects of this changes on
achievement, we introduce into the EPF the dummy variables NPROFITA and
CHANGECL. As will be seen in the empirical analysis, CHANGECL is usually not
significant, while NPROFITA has a negative impact on achievement, but only level
NPROFITA ≥ 3 is sometimes significant.
The grading practices of each teacher in 2005 have been profiled according to
Table 3. The profiles are gathered by means of cluster analysis6 and, as a result, 15
groups have been identified. These groups are described in Table 4.
Table 4. Fifteen groups of grading practices identified by our method and corresponding to
the items of the categorical variable DfR.
Class Grade F Grade D Grade C Grade B Grade A
Group 1
8 0 0 0
13 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0
33 0 0 0
47 0 0
48 0 0 0
56 0 0 0 −1
Group 2
2 −1 1 0 0
10 1 0 0
20 −1 1 0 0
24 −1 1 0
64 1 0 0
69 0 1 0 0
Group 3
3 0 1 1 3
11 0 1 1 2 3
70 0 1 1 2
Group 4
4 −1 1 1 1
58 −2 1 1 2 1
74 −1 1 1
76 −1 0 1 2
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Education Economics 13
Table 4. (Continued.)
Class Grade F Grade D Grade C Grade B Grade A
Group 5
5 1 0 1
23 0 1 −1 1
41 1 0
53 1 0 1
55 0 1 0 1 1
Group 6
6 0 0 1 0
18 0 0 1 0
22 0 0 1
49 0 1 0
57 0 0 1 0 1
61 −1 1 0 0
77 0 1 0
Group 7
7 0 1 1 1 1
12 0 1 1 1 0
16 1 1 1
25 0 1 1 1
32 1 1 1
39 0 1
51 1 1 1
67 1 1 1 1
68 0 1 1 1
73 0 1 1
Group 8
1 −1 −1 0 0
27 −1 0 1
65 −2 −1 0
66 −1 −1 0 0
71 0 −1 −1 0
Group 9
9 −1 1 2 2
37 0 1 2
59 1 2 2
60 1 2 2 3
62 0 1 2 2 3
72 0 1 2 2
Group 10
14 0 0 1
31 0 0 0 2
40 0 0 0 1
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14  S.M. Iacus and G. Porro
The 15 groups correspond to the items of the categorical variable DfR and repre-
sent the variety of grading standards applied in the 77 classes of the survey in 2005.
6. Results on empirical data
This section illustrates the empirical analysis of the impact of grading practices on
students’ competence. We compare the results obtained using the DfR approach with
those obtained assuming linearity of the grading equations.
6.1 Can grading practice be ordered?
Consider Table 4: the first group in DfR shows the smallest deviance from the
reference grading practice; all of the other groups exhibit different levels and kinds of
deviation, which are clearly difficult to order. In fact – while teachers in Group 13 or
Group 14 surely have higher standards, compared with teachers in Group 9 or Group
12 – the comparability of Group 4 and Group 8 is more debatable: teachers in Group 4
tend to emphasize the differences among students and, therefore, apply high standard
to the lowest achievement levels but are more generous, in terms of grades, to students
Table 4. (Continued.).
Class Grade F Grade D Grade C Grade B Grade A
Group 11
21 0 1 2 0
44 0 1 2 1
52 1 2 1
54 1 2 2 2
63 0 2 2 1
Group 12
17 1 1 0
50 1 1 0
Group 13
26 0 −1 −1 −1
30 −2 −1 −1 −1 0
35 −1 −1 −1 0
36 −1 0 −1
46 −3 −2 −1 −1
Group 14
34 −2 −2 −1 0
38 0 −1 −2
42 −2 −2
75 −2 −1 −2
Group 15
43 1 1 1 2
45 0 1 1 2
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Education Economics 15
with medium-high performances; teachers in Group 8, on the contrary, seem to penal-
ize intermediate performances.
This is the main contribution of variable DfR, compared with the indicators of
grading standards usually adopted in the literature: DfR respects the heterogeneity of
grading practices and does not force an order of grading standards. It simply groups
standards that are similar according to the criterion announced in Table 3. Therefore,
the impact we are going to estimate on students’ achievement is not forced to be the
impact of higher or lower standards, but – more realistically – it will be the effect of
different kinds of grading practice.
6.2 The education production function with DfR
We estimate the following EPF: 
where i runs in the set of indexes of all students, and the variables M05ITA, GENDER,
M03ITA, NCLASS, NPROFITA, CHANGECL and BOOKS are defined in Section 4.1
while DfR is defined in Section 5.
Table 5 contains the results for Mod1.7 The Italian language ability of students in
2005 clearly depends on the initial achievement level (M03ITA). Female students
gain, ceteris paribus, higher achievement. Family background exhibits a positive
impact whose value and significance increase with the quality of the background
itself.
Several groups of classes in DfR have a significant impact on the achievement
level. In particular, the highest positive effect with respect to the reference grad-
ing practice is shown by Groups 13 and 14. As we mentioned, teachers belonging
to these groups have quite selective grading standards. Their students rarely
receive a Grade A, but some of them would have if they had been graded using
the reference grading practice: indeed, all the students in these classes with Grade
B have test scores belonging to the interval [0.9, 1.0]. Moreover, the students with
Grade F often would get a more than positive evaluation in the reference class. On
the other side, the strongest negative effect comes from Groups 3, 9 and 12. In
these classes, grading practices are clearly less severe: students with the
highest grades often had a quite poor performance in the achievement test;
frequently, students who would fail in the reference class obtain a Grade D or
even a Grade C. To confirm that the relationship between grading practices and
achievement cannot easily be reduced to a monotonic curve, we should also notice
the composition of Group 6: in fact, despite the evidence of grading practices with
null or slightly positive deviation, the impact on the test scores is significantly
positive.
6.3 A comparison: DfR versus linear regression
We now compare the use of DfR with the use of linear grading equations in the EPF.
Consider again the linear grading Equation (1) for each class: 
M TA GENDER M ITA NCLASS
NPROFITA CHANGECL BOOKS DfR
i i i i
i i i i
05 03
                             Mod
I     
   
   
   
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 1( )
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Table 5. Results for Mod1, Mod2 and Mod3.
Mod1 Mod2 Mod3
Intercept 0.558* 1.696*** 0.659*
(0.260) (0.288) (0.305)
GENDER: female 0.223*** 0.260*** 0.225***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046)
M03ITA 0.365*** 0.351*** 0.352***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
NCLASS −0.006 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NPROFITA: two/one −0.062 −0.055 −0.090
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
NPROFITA: three or more/one −0.106 −0.187* −0.109
(0.076) (0.077) (0.076)
CHANGECL: no/yes 0.473** 0.372* 0.443**
(0.151) (0.159) (0.150)
BOOKS: 11–25/0–10 0.170 0.230 0.193
(0.161) (0.169) (0.160)
BOOKS: 26–100/0–10 0.365* 0.387* 0.374*
(0.152) (0.159) (0.151)
BOOKS: 101–200/0–10 0.465** 0.533*** 0.493**
(0.153) (0.161) (0.152)
BOOKS: >200/0–10 0.578*** 0.672*** 0.606***
(0.152) (0.160) (0.151)
DfR: 2/1 −0.162 −0.109
(0.100) (0.101)
DfR: 3/1 −0.499*** −0.414**
(0.130) (0.138)
DfR: 4/1 −0.186 −0.096
(0.122) (0.124)
DfR: 5/1 −0.025 −0.022
(0.115) (0.120)
DfR: 6/1 0.357*** 0.390***
(0.098) (0.102)
DfR: 7/1 −0.252** −0.160
(0.091) (0.102)
DfR: 8/1 0.733*** 0.799***
(0.117) (0.118)
DfR: 9/1 −0.637*** −0.453***
(0.113) (0.123)
DfR: 10/1 −0.067 −0.072
(0.127) (0.128)
DfR: 11/1 0.097 0.209
(0.146) (0.149)
DfR: 12/1 −0.491*** −0.272*
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Education Economics 17
where Cj is the set of indexes of the observations in class j, and j = 1, …, 77, and
insert the estimated  and  as grading standard indicators into the following EPF: 
At the 5% level, 92% of the estimated values of β0 (respectively 97% at 1%) and 28%
of the estimated values of β1 (respectively 52% at 1%) are not significant: in other
words, in our case the grading standards seem to be better summarized by the slope of
the grading equation. Table 5 also presents the result of the EPF estimation for Mod2.
The coefficients associated with  and  are negative and significant, which is intu-
itive but not as informative as the results concerning the variable DfR. The overall
goodness of the model measured by the adjusted R2 and by the AIC8 index confirms
that our variable DfR better captures the relationship between students’ achievements
and grading practices.
Incidentally, Mod1 and Mod2 provide similar evidence: harder grading stan-
dards are associated with higher achievement levels. Our main point is: Do the
linear grading equations and the DfR variable also provide the same information
about the grading practices in the 77 classes? The answer seems to be negative. In
fact, when DfR and the linear grading equation are used together in the EPF, as in
Mod3: 
ITA FST SCITA i Ci i i i j05 050 1= + ∈β β ,
βˆ0 βˆ1
M TA GENDER M ITA NCLASS NPROFITA
CHANGECL BOOKS
i i i i i
i i i i
05 03
                       Mod
1      
   
    
     
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 0 8 1 2ˆ ˆ ( )
βˆ0 βˆ1
Table 5. (Continued).
Mod1 Mod2 Mod3
(0.108) (0.131)
DfR: 13/1 0.904*** 0.720***
(0.108) (0.118)
DfR: 14/1 1.254*** 0.885***
(0.123) (0.158)
DfR: 15/1 −0.123 −0.029
(0.171) (0.189)
−0.603*** −0.208**
(0.041) (0.074)
−0.333*** −0.092
(0.031) (0.049)
R2 0.451 0.384 0.459
Adj. R2 0.440 0.378 0.447
AIC 2952.075 3068.101 2938.402
n 1219 1219 1219
Note: Mod1, EPF as in Equation (Mod1) with DfR only; Mod2, EPF as in Equation (Mod2) with β0 and 
β1 only; Mod3, combination of Mod1 and Mod2. Significance at ***0.001, **0.01, *0.05.
ˆ0
βˆ1
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18  S.M. Iacus and G. Porro
what we notice is that all values of DfR that are significant in Mod1 are still significant
in Mod3 with the exception of DfR7, and  is not significant. This shows how DfR
captures both linearities and non-linearities. At the same time,  is significant and
DfR7 is not but, looking at the group identified by DfR7, it can be seen that the corre-
sponding grading practices are simply a translation of the reference practice (which is,
in turn, linear). Therefore, the effect of DfR7 is captured by .
As mentioned, we have estimated Mod1–Mod3 with a two-stage least squares
approach to take into account heteroscedasticity among classes that may potentially
affect estimates of β0 and β1 due to different class sizes.
9
7. Policy implications
Contrary to the majority of the literature, we have shown with an empirical analysis
that the relationship between students’ achievement and teachers’ grades is frequently
non-linear. We have also shown how unreliable it is to use data aggregated at school
level to prove that policies exist at that level. On the other hand, our results confirm
the accepted knowledge that higher grading standards can increase achievement.
Therefore, the present paper puts its emphasis on basically two complementary facts:
a correct analysis needs to identify individual teachers’ grading practices and only
after that can one aggregate at higher levels; and grading practices are usually non-
linear, hence a DfR approach can properly identify individual grading practices (both
linear and non-linear).
An underlying issue, which may prevent the adoption of the DfR approach, is that
an objective measure of achievement has to be available (e.g. the scores of a multiple
choice test). That is why we share with other studies (see Dardanoni, Modica, and
Pennisi 2009a, 2009b) the recommendation for a centralized monitoring of students’
competence, still absent in Italy: it is a pre-condition to compare educational institu-
tions nationwide and to take degenerative phenomena (e.g. grade inflation, excessive
heterogeneity in achievement levels) under control.
If the aim of centralized monitoring is to induce higher achievement levels, limit
grade inflation and reduce heterogeneity in teachers’ practices, the incentives
provided by the educational authorities should be correctly designed. As we have
shown, grading practices are teacher specific: hence, one can think that incentives
should be conditioned to the single teacher performance, rather than to a hypothetical
school-based grading policy. On the other hand, the policy-maker may wish to assign
resources at some level of aggregation (school, district, etc.), because this pursues,
among others, redistributive aims.
Therefore, the elements of an adequate policy (given the availability of an
objective measure of competence at the single-teacher level)10 could be the following:
determine a baseline grading practice at some central level; evaluate the DfR indicator
at the single-teacher level; aggregate the results at the school/district level by, for
example, measuring the proportion of teachers that are compliant or use grading
standards stricter than the reference (i.e. DfR profile contains zeros or negative
M TA GENDER M ITA NCLASS
NPROFITA CHANGECL BOOKS
DfR
i i i i
i i i i
i i
05 03
                          
                                    Mod
1     
   
 
   
    
  
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 0
8 1 9 3
ˆ
ˆ ( )
βˆ1
βˆ0
βˆ0
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Education Economics 19
numbers); and condition the resources assignment to the proportion of compliant (or
more demanding) practices.
The policy, as it can be seen, tolerates a portion of ‘deviant’ behaviors (less
demanding grading procedures): this is to allow some teachers use strategically their
grading practices to address all of the school aims, including the social mission of the
educational system (the ‘no child left behind’ issue). As suggested by the literature
(Lillard and DeCicca 2001), in fact, the adoption of severe standards may increase the
incidence of dropouts.
8. What can go wrong?
This section aims at discussing a few issues that may prevent or limit the use of our
approach in specific situations.
8.1 What if a reference cannot be easily found?
In our particular experiment a reference like the one proposed in Table 2 can be
reasonably designed and accepted. In some contexts a reference is sometimes exoge-
nous: in measuring health status of individuals, some reference values for biological
tests (blood pressure, etc.) are usually provided by authorities (e.g. World Health
Organization); in quality of life analysis, several indicators (earnings, family structure,
town size, level of pollution, etc.) are used to identify a reference level of welfare; and
so forth. In other cases, the identification of a reference may not be so obvious. In
these situations a reference can still be identified by some automatic rule. To simplify
the exposition and still make it general, assume both the objective quantitative
measurement X (e.g. the scores) and the subjective qualitative evaluation Y (e.g. the
gradings) are available. Assume Y has k values and partition the support of X in
exactly k intervals. Then, the following two conditions must be realized in order to
properly create a DfR variable that is able to discriminate deviations from the auto-
matic reference: each interval of X is uniquely associated (mapped) to a single value
of Y (and vice versa); and the intervals must contain a sufficient number of observa-
tions. Therefore, for example, a straightforward way to construct an automatic
reference is to partition the support of X in equi-frequent intervals and associate the
first interval of X with the first value of Y (even if Y is not necessarily ordered),
associate the second interval of X with the second value of Y, and so forth. Of course,
when a natural or meaningful reference can be identified – like in our application – its
use is advisable because it helps with the interpretation of the results.
8.2 Subjective versus objective
The DfR approach clearly works on the basis of the existence of an objective measure
of achievement. This is reasonable to obtain in situations where achievement is
measured by an exogenous (to the teacher) test (e.g. multiple choice, comprehension
test) in which marking is not controversial. In this case, given the maximum potential
score of the test, normalization of students’ scores are easy and reasonably interpret-
able. In examinations where the measure of achievement cannot be objectively quan-
tified (e.g. examinations by essays), some bias in the value of the final score is induced
by the correctors, no matter how strict are the guiding rules given to them. In these
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20  S.M. Iacus and G. Porro
situations, our approach is hardly justifiable in that DfR assumes that an accepted
reference can be given and deviation from it can be measured.
The test, as usual, has to be well calibrated (not too easy, not too hard), in order to
avoid that the scores are squeezed at the top or at the bottom of the score range: in that
case, in fact, a teacher might appear as non-compliant with the reference grading
practice, because the test is not able to discriminate the different achievement levels
of students. Clearly, it is easy to detect a non-calibrated test ex post and, possibly, re-
calibrate it before applying the DfR procedure.
8.3 School level versus teacher level
If the dimension of the classes is too small, both linear modeling and DfR may suffer
from very small sample size. In particular, the DfR variable may be difficult to identify
because cluster analysis may fail to find significantly different grading profiles. In
these cases, aggregation at school level is the only information that can be extracted
from the data. Still, DfR remains competitive compared with linear modeling.
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Notes
1. Formally, it is an inverse grading equation.
2. For example, each score is divided by the maximal attainable score of the complete
test.
3. In the Italian educational system, ‘elementary’ corresponds to Grades 1–5, ‘lower secondary’
to Grades 6–8, and ‘higher secondary’ up to Grade 13.
4. It is a polynomial local regression (loess): see Cleveland, Grosse, and Shyu (1992).
5. Which may or may not exist for a given data-set.
6. In our application, we apply the Random Recursive Partitioning method (see Iacus and
Porro 2007, 2009) to derive a proximity measure between profiles, and then apply the
hierarchical cluster analysis. Any other clustering method or distance between profiles
would be applicable.
7. In order to take into account for variables estimated/defined at class/cluster level, all
models (Mod1, Mod2 and Mod3) are estimated using a two-stage Weighted Least Square
(WLS) regression with appropriate weights.
8. Indeed, the AIC statistic is given by AIC = −2log likelihood(θ) + 2dim(θ), where θ is the
vector of coefficients and dim(θ) is the number of parameters to be estimated. In Mod1 we
have, due to DfR, 13 parameters more than in Mod2: this notwithstanding, the AIC has a
lower value.
9. To control for potential unobservables we have also regressed M05ITAi – M03ITAi against
all other variables of Mod1–Mod3, with either DfR or ( , ) or both. In all of these
modifications, the empirical evidence remains basically the same as in Mod1–Mod3.
10. This is, for instance, still not available in the OECD PISA 2003 survey.
References
Betts, J.R. 1997. Do grading standards affect the incentive to learn? Discussion Paper 97–22,
Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego.
Betts, J.R. 1998. The impact of educational standards on the level and distribution of earnings.
American Economic Review 88: 266–75.
ˆ0 βˆ1
Do
wn
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Po
rr
o,
 G
iu
se
pp
e]
 A
t:
 2
0:
37
 7
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
00
9
Education Economics 21
Betts, J.R., and J. Grogger. 2003. The impact of grading standards on student achievement,
educational attainment, and entry-level earnings. Economics of Education Review 22:
343–52.
Bonesronning, H. 1999. The variation in teachers’ grading practices: Causes and conse-
quences. Economics of Education Review 18: 89–105.
Bonesronning, H. 2004a. Do the teachers’ grading practices affect student achievement?
Education Economics 12: 151–67.
Bonesronning, H. 2004b. Can effective teacher behavior be identified? Economics of
Education Review 23: 237–47.
Bonesronning, H. 2008. The effect of grading practices on gender differences in academic
performance. Bulletin of Economic Research 60: 245–64.
Card, D. 1999. The causal effect of schooling on earnings. In Handbook of labor economics,
ed. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 1801–63. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Cleveland, W.S., E. Grosse, and W.M. Shyu. 1992. Local regression models. In Statistical
models in S, ed. J.M. Chambers and T.J. Hastie, 309–76. Monterey: Wadsworth and
Brooks-Cole.
Correa, H., and G.W. Gruver. 1987. Teacher–student interaction: A game theoretic extension
of the economic theory of education. Mathematical Social Science 13: 19–47.
Costrell, R.M. 1994. A simple model of educational standards. American Economic Review
84: 956–71.
Dardanoni, V., S. Modica, and A. Pennisi. 2009a. Grading across schools. The B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy 9: no. 1.
Dardanoni, V., S. Modica, and A. Pennisi. 2009b. School grading and institutional contexts.
Mimeo. Universit  di Palermo, Palermo.
Figlio, D.N., and M.E. Lucas. 2004. Do high grading standards affect student performance?
Journal of Public Economics 88: 1815–34.
Hanushek, E.A. 2002. Evidence, politics, and the class size debate. In The class size debate,
ed. L. Mishel and R. Rothstein, 37–65. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.
Hanushek, E.A. 2003. The failure of input-based schooling policies. Economic Journal 113:
F64–98.
Iacus, S.M., and G. Porro. 2007. Missing data imputation, matching and other applications
of random recursive partitioning. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 52, no. 2:
773–89.
Iacus, S.M., and G. Porro. 2009. Random Recursive Partitioning: A matching method for the
estimation of the average treatment effect. Journal of Applied Econometrics 24: 163–85.
Johnes, G. 2004. Standards and grade inflation. In International handbook on the economics
of education, ed. G. Johnes and J. Johnes, 462–83. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Krueger, A.B. 2002. Understanding the magnitude and effect of class size on student achieve-
ment. In The class size debate, ed. L. Mishel and R. Rothstein, 7–35. Washington, DC:
Economic Policy Institute.
Krueger, A.B. 2003. Economic considerations and class size. Economic Journal 113: F34–63.
Lillard, D.R., and P.P. DeCicca. 2001. Higher standards, more dropouts? Evidence within and
across time. Economics of Education Review 20: 459–73.
Marks, D. 2002. Academic standards as public goods and varieties of free-rider behaviour.
Education Economics 10: 145–63.
OECD. 2005. PISA 2003 technical report. Paris: OECD.
a`
Do
wn
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Po
rr
o,
 G
iu
se
pp
e]
 A
t:
 2
0:
37
 7
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
00
9
